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The United States has a mortality disadvantage relative to its political and economic peer group of other
rich democracies. Recently it has been suggested that there could be a role for social policy in explaining
this disadvantage. In this paper, we test this “social policy hypothesis” by presenting a time-series cross-
section analysis from 1970 to 2010 of the association between welfare state generosity (for unemploy-
ment insurance, sickness beneﬁts, and pensions) and life expectancy, for the US and 17 other high-
income countries. Fixed-effects estimation with autocorrelation-corrected standard errors (robust to
unmeasured between-country differences and serial autocorrelation of repeated measures) found strong
associations betweenwelfare generosity and life expectancy. A unit increase in overall welfare generosity
yields a 0.17 year increase in life expectancy at birth (p < 0.001), and a 0.07 year increase in life ex-
pectancy at age 65 (p < 0.001). The strongest effects of the welfare state are in the domain of pension
beneﬁts (b ¼ 0.439 for life expectancy at birth, p < 0.001; b ¼ 0.199 for life expectancy at age 65,
p < 0.001). Models that lag the measures of social policy by ten years produce similar results, suggesting
that the results are not driven by endogeneity bias. There is evidence that the US mortality disadvantage
is, in part, a welfare-state disadvantage. We estimate that life expectancy in the US would be approxi-
mately 3.77 years longer, if it had just the average social policy generosity of the other 17 OECD nations.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recent reports highlight growing concern about the “US mor-
tality disadvantage” e the growing gap in life expectancy between
the US and other rich democracies (Crimmins et al., 2010; Woolf
and Aron, 2013). Previous research into the underperformance of
the US in terms of health and mortality e relative to its peer group
of “rich democracies” (Wilensky, 2002) e tends to focus on
individual-level lifestyle factors and healthcare systems (Crimmins
et al., 2010; Woolf and Aron 2013). Much less work has investigated
macro-level welfare state institutional arrangements, which might
also help to account for the US mortality disadvantage. This paper
addresses this issue by (1) investigating long-term trends in life
expectancy and social policy in the 18 richest democracies of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
and (2) quantifying the contribution of social policy shortcomings
in the US to the US mortality disadvantage.ﬁeld).
r Ltd. This is an open access article1.1. US mortality disadvantage
The US mortality disadvantage is a pressing priority for policy
and research (Woolf and Aron, 2013). In 1960, Scandinavian nations
topped the life expectancy (at birth) charts, with Norway's life
expectancy of 73.8 years (OECD, 2012). The US ranked ﬁfteenth, at
69.8 years: a gap of four years. The average life expectancy at birth
for the 18 OECD countries in 1960 was 70.8 years. By 2010, the US
had dropped to the bottom of the relative rankings, with a life
expectancy of 78.7 years compared to 83.0 years in table-topping
Japan (OECD, 2012). There is a similar pattern for infant mortality
rates: in 1960, the US ranked eleventh with an infant mortality rate
of 26.0, double Iceland's rate of 13.0; by 2010, this relative differ-
ence grew as the US dropped to the bottom of the list with an infant
mortality rate of 6.1 - nearly triple table-topping Iceland's rate of
2.2 (OECD, 2012).
The relatively poor health performance of the US emerged in the
1980s (Woolf and Aron, 2013). In the 1940s for example, the US had
one of the healthiest populations in the world. But the recent Na-
tional Academy of Sciences panel report on the US healthunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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least nine domains of health, than residents of other rich de-
mocracies e and the disadvantage was consistent across all socio-
economic positions. This cross-cutting difference in the distribution
of population health supports the notion that macro-level institu-
tional factors like social policy differences - not just lifestyle or
health care factors - may help to explain the US disadvantage
(Woolf and Aron, 2013).
1.2. Lifestyle and health care explanations
The US now has one of the lowest smoking rates of high-income
countries; of comparable countries, only Sweden has lower rates.
However, historically it was the highest tobacco consumer and
there is evidence that around 20% of the US health disadvantage in
terms of life expectancy andmortality of the over 50s is attributable
to these historical differences in smoking rates (Preston et al.,
2010). There are also signiﬁcant differences in diet between the
US and other countries. For example, average calorie intake per US
adult is 3770 per day, and obesity also thus contributes to mortality
differences among adults aged 50 and over (Preston and Stokes,
2011). The results of studies that examine cross-national differ-
ences in physical activity rates vary e with some suggesting that
the US population has about average rates of activity, while others
suggest it is lower (Woolf and Aron, 2013). Turning to alcohol
consumption, there is tentative evidence that heavy drinking and
binge drinking might be higher amongst young Americans, yet the
overall prevalence of alcohol consumption amongst Americans is
lower than for Europe (Woolf and Aron, 2013).
The US spends the most on health care e in absolute terms, per
head of population and as a proportion of national income e
around 18% of US gross domestic product is spent on health care
compared to around 6% in the UK (Woolf and Aron, 2013). Unlike
other high-income countries that operate a social insurance system
(whereby the government, employers and employees co-fund
health care via regular set contributions e.g. France and Germany)
or a national health system (where health care is funded by the
government based on general taxation e.g. the UK, Sweden or New
Zealand), the US system is effectively a private market. Individuals
buy insurance policies themselves to cover their health risk, or
receive coverage from their employers. There are some
government-funded schemes for the very poor (Medicaid) and for
the elderly (Medicare) but these are not as generous as schemes in
other countries. The ‘Obamacare’ Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act reforms of 2010 did increase coverage rates, but today
around 10% of Americans remain without health insurance of any
kind and therefore only have access to emergency care e not pre-
vention or primary or secondary care. Millions of others remain
“under-insured”whereby their health care policies do not cover the
full range of health services or their health needs. US patients also
face considerable out-of-pocket payments and co-payments for
services (Woolf and Aron, 2013). This all means that healthcare
access in the US is the most “commodiﬁed” (market dependent) of
high-income nations, and the healthiest people have the best ac-
cess to healthcare, in line with the ‘inverse care law’ (Tudor-Hart,
1971).
1.3. Institutional explanations
At the level of theory, we argue that institutional arrangements
like the welfare state are important for at least three reasons. First,
welfare states stratify (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The welfare states
that people are born into organize social relations, sorting and
ranking people into social hierarchies. Welfare states also affect
income inequality (Alderson and Nielsen, 2002). Poverty is alsolargely a function of institutional arrangements (Brady, 2008).
Indeed, previous research has indicated the important role that
different antipoverty policy strategies can have on health out-
comes, resulting in signiﬁcant cross-national patterns. For example,
Lundberg et al. (2008) have shown how universal pensions and
family policies that support dual-earners can lead to reductions in
old agemortality and infant mortality respectively. Esser and Palme
(2010) found similar results for pensions - particularly the value of
the basic state pension for older women's health. Nelson and
Fritzell (2014) found that the generosity of minimum income
beneﬁts available to those with no entitlement to contributory
beneﬁts (the poorest groups in high-income countries) was
strongly associated with population level mortality rates and life
expectancy: countries that provided higher minimum income
beneﬁts had better population health.
Second, again at the level of theory, welfare states not only in-
ﬂuence the extent and kind of social stratiﬁcation in society, but
they also condition the operation of the social determinants of
health (Beckﬁeld et al., 2015). For example, thewelfare statee itself
a complex of citizenship rights (Marshall, 1950) e provides re-
sources to citizens that may make other kinds of market resources
less necessary for preventing illness and ensuring good health. An
example of a fairly direct effect of the welfare state on health would
be healthcare services (Bambra, 2005). A less direct way in which
institutions impact health is by providing stingier or more generous
cash beneﬁts in times of unemployment or sickness (Esping-
Andersen, 1990). In countries with more generous social pro-
grams, the health of the poorest should be better thus enhancing
overall population health. For example, research by Mackenbach
et al. (2011a, b) found that inequality related losses to health
amount to more than 700,000 deaths per year and 33 million
prevalent cases of ill health in the European Union.
Third, it is possible that social policy itself is affected by
population-health improvements, such that part of any association
between social policy and population health might result from the
endogeneity of social policy generosity to the health of the popu-
lation, and especially the health of older cohorts, which can be
expected to be larger in healthier societies, ceteris paribus
(Mackenbach et al., 2011a, b; Vogt and Kluge, 2015; Gunasekara
et al., 2014). Indeed, the effect of population aging on social pol-
icy is well established in the comparative political economy liter-
ature (Wilensky, 2002). For this reason, we emphasize our models
of life expectancy at birth, which are shown in tables. We also es-
timate models that use ten-year lags for the social policy measures,
to guard against reverse causation. Of course, without experimental
data or a strong instrumental variable, we acknowledge it is
impossible to rule out endogeneity bias.
In the growing ﬁeld of research on the role of thewelfare state in
producing population health, studies have fairly consistently
shown that infant mortality rates (IMR) vary signiﬁcantly by wel-
fare state, with rates lowest in themore generous Social Democratic
countries of Scandinavia and highest in the less generous Liberal
(e.g. US and UK) and Southern (e.g. Spain or Italy) welfare states
(Chung and Muntaner, 2006, 2007; Coburn, 2004; Eikemo et al.,
2008; Abdul et al., 2010; Navarro et al., 2003, 2006).
There are, however, several limitations to such regime-based
comparative analysis of population health. While such studies are
useful for explaining cross-sectional variation in population health
proﬁles, they aggregate information across policy domains, they
overlook within-regime policy heterogeneity, and they elide cross-
national within-regime differences in trends (Beckﬁeld and Krieger,
2009). Other studies have therefore compared more speciﬁc wel-
fare state policies such as pension provision (universal versus
contributory), family policies (traditional family versus dual earner
support), total expenditure on speciﬁc beneﬁts such as on sickness
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come support levels (Lundberg et al., 2008; Dahl and van der Wel,
2013; Nelson and Fritzell, 2014).
The ﬁrst contribution of our study, then, is to connect change in
social policy over a long timespan (1970e2010) to changes over
time in population health, using rigorous models that account for
both unmeasured stable country characteristics, and serial auto-
correlation. Our second is to analyse directly the possible contri-
bution of social policy to the US mortality disadvantage.
2. Methods
2.1. Population health
Our dependent variable is (1) life expectancy at birth (annual
measures, 1971 to 2010, from OECD Health Data [OECD, 2012]). We
also conduct supplemental analysis using life expectancy at age 65;
the two sets of models produce very similar results, and sowe focus
on life expectancy at birth. Our focal independent variables are four
measures of the welfare state from 1971 to 2010: (1) overall beneﬁt
generosity, (2) unemployment insurance generosity, (3) sickness
insurance generosity, and (4) pension beneﬁt generosity. These
data come from the Comparative Welfare Entitlements Database II
(Scruggs et al., 2014). The data and codebook are publicly available
at www.cwed2.org. Key advantages are rigorous over-time and
cross-national comparability, and detailed documentation of cod-
ing that facilitates replication. Full details on the construction of the
generosity indices we use here are provided by Scruggs (2014). We
address endogeneity by estimating models that lag the covariates
by ﬁve and ten years, respectively; because of space constraints we
show only the ten-year-lag results but we note that the ﬁve-year-
lag results are consistent with those shown.
2.2. Welfare-state generosity
In contrast to the regimes approach, our measures include both
cross-national and within-nation, over-time variation in welfare
states, and program-speciﬁc information on the generosity and
coverage of unemployment insurance, sickness beneﬁts, and public
pension programs. For each program, beneﬁt generosity is
measured as a function of (1) the percentage of the average worker
wage that is replaced by beneﬁts, (2) the duration of beneﬁts, (3)
restrictions on beneﬁt eligibility, such as waiting periods, retire-
ment ages, and work requirements, and (4) the coverage rate or
take-up rate. The ﬁrst three characteristics are each transformed to
a z-score, using all available data on each characteristic as the
reference distribution. For unemployment insurance and sickness
beneﬁts, the relative generosity level of each beneﬁt is then
multiplied by the proportion of the labor force that is covered by
each beneﬁt. For pensions, the relative generosity is multiplied by
the take-up rate. Thus, for each year, and for unemployment, sick-
ness, and pensions, each welfare state receives a generosity score
that is based on its beneﬁt generosity relative to the distribution of
generosity across all countries and years included in the CWED
data, and the extent to which each beneﬁt covers the relevant
population. The overall generosity summary score combines this
information into one index.
Speciﬁcally, the summary score is calculated by summing the
normalized scores for each of the characteristics that deﬁne the
generosity of each program, and taking the product of that quantity
and the population coverage rate or take-up rate. Thus overall
generosity is weighted by coverage, and is calculated on the basis of
within-domain relative generosity. For unemployment and sick-
ness insurance, these characteristics are the income replacement
rate, the duration of beneﬁts, the qualifying period, and the numberof waiting days. For pension beneﬁts, these characteristics are the
replacement rates from standard and supplemental social pensions,
the expected duration, the number of qualifying years required, and
the employee funding ratio. For each characteristic of each policy,
the log (of non-zero values) is ﬁrst taken to adjust for skew, and
then the z-score is calculated on the basis of the standard deviation
(top- and bottom-coded at 2.5 and 2.5) and the mean of the
logged scores (where 0s are unlogged), for the entire distribution of
scores on that measure across all countries and years of available
data. Next, those z-scores are reverse-coded so that higher scores
indicate more beneﬁts, summed, and multiplied by the coverage/
take-up rate to create relative generosity scores for unemploy-
ment, sickness, and pension beneﬁts, respectively. Additional de-
tails are available from Scruggs (2014), including the Stata code
required to produce the summary scores from the raw data.
To clarify the construction of these measures, consider the cases
of the United States, Germany, and Sweden. In 2010, the United
States scores 21.7 on the summary measure of relative generosity,
which is mainly a function of low levels of generosity relative to the
maximum generosity scores for the countries and years included in
the data (maxima on unemployment, sickness, and pensions are
observed in Norway, 2000e2001, Sweden, 1987e1990, and Swe-
den, 1983, respectively). This is toward the low end of summary
generosity, which ranges from 20.9 (Australia) to 43.9 (Norway)
among the 18 countries in the data in 2010. Germany's summary
relative generosity score for 2010 is 32, which is more a function of
restricted coverage of non means-tested public insurance (76% for
unemployment insurance, and 83% for sickness insurance) than
beneﬁt generosity. In 2010, Sweden's summary relative generosity
score is 35.2; its decline from a high of 46.6 in 1989 is a function of
declining generosity in all three domains of the welfare state, and
declining coverage in the area of unemployment insurance. Crucial
for interpretation is the fact that these measures of social policy
generosity are inherently relative, although originating in very
speciﬁc policy indicators. As such, the relative rankings on these
measures are reliable, and a one-unit change means the same thing
at the bottom of the generosity distribution as it does at the top, but
the quantity of each score itself has no direct interpretation (e.g., it
is not a percentage).
2.3. Fixed-effects estimation with autocorrelation correction
We employ ﬁxed-effects models with an autocorrelation
adjustment. Fixed-effects models remove the effects of all stable,
unmeasured country characteristics (such as geographic location,
size, economic attributes, and ethnic diversity) by including in the
model an indicator variable for each country (or, equivalently, by
substracting each observation from its within-country mean on
each variable). The autocorrelation adjustment is used because all
the variables are highly serially correlated (e.g., life expectancy in
year t is largely a function of life expectancy in year t-1). We have a
total of 637 cases for the estimation, after deleting country-years
with missing data on any of the variables we use. We include 18
OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,
and the United States. For the main analyses shown in Table 1, we
have aminimum of 27 observations per country, and amaximum of
39 observations per country, 1971e2010.
To evaluate the robustness of our results to potential con-
founding from other factors that are associated with both welfare-
state development and life expectancy, we estimate additional
models that introduce controls for real (inﬂation- and PPP-
adjusted) GDP per capita, the size of the population aged 65 and
older as a percentage of the total population, and the OECD's
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percentage of GDP. We control for GDP per capita because it is
associated with health and may reduce mortality, holding citizen-
ship rights constant (McKeown, 1976). We control for the per-
centage of the population aged 65 and older to adjust for the
potential feedback effects of population health on social policy. Our
models, however, assume the exogeneity of social policy, which
might be a more reasonable assumption for OECD welfare states
than for developing welfare states, since social policy generosity is
on the decline in many aging populations, such as Germany and
Sweden. Nevertheless, recognizing that there are still probably
feedback effects from health to social policy, we include a control
for the proportion of the population that is aged 65 and older,
following the logic that social policy effects net of population aging
should be less vulnerable to this source of endogeneity. Finally, we
control for public and private social expenditure because many
welfare states use a mix of public and private supports. The dif-
ferences between the expenditure data and the policy-based CWED
data are that expenditure is “downstream” from policy, and the
expenditure data capture private social spending net of the public
spending that is uniquely caused by the policy-basedmeasures also
included in the models (the OECD measure also includes several
areas of social spending, including income supports, housing, and
family supports, among other policy domains; see Adema et al.
(2011)). We expect (and ﬁnd) positive associations for all three
controls. Data for public and private social expenditure are taken
from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al., 2015).
Models that include all the controls use many fewer observations,
because of limitations on data availability, as shown in the sample
sizes reported in the table titles.
To simulate a counterfactual scenario of generous US social
policy, and evaluate how life expectancy might be different under
such a scenario, we estimate a Blinder-Oaxaca regression decom-
position (Greene, 2000:251e253). This regression decomposition
approach is more commonly applied in labor economics research,
where it was developed to analyse sex differences in wages as a
function of both (a) sex differences in returns to human capital, and
(b) sex differences in the stock of human capital. The decomposi-
tion allows the analyst to examine what the difference in the
outcome would be between two groups, if the groups were iden-
tical on measured covariates, and their effects. The decomposition
also quantiﬁes the contribution of the differences in the measured
covariates, vs. the differences in the regression coefﬁcients, across
the two groups. We apply this approach to the case of the US
mortality disadvantage by estimating one model for the US, andTable 1
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Life Expectancy at Birth
on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Generosity,
Sickness Insurance Generosity, and Pension Beneﬁt Generosity (n ¼ 637).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.293***
(10.83)
0.313***
(11.98)
0.302***
(11.37)
0.297***
(11.02)
0.297***
(11.62)
Generosity 0.167***
(7.07)
Unemployment 0.225***
(4.82)
Sickness 0.113*
(2.42)
Pension 0.439***
(7.60)
Constant 69.83***
(1087.16)
63.50***
(766.31)
67.19***
(924.09)
68.49***
(930.81)
64.33***
(789.60)
Notes:
t-statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.one model for the non-US OECD countries. We combine the infor-
mation from these separate models using Jann's (2008) “oaxaca”
add-on program for Stata, which reports estimated life expectancy
if the US had the average social policy generosity of the rest of the
OECD (the “endowments effect”), the estimated life expectancy if
the US had the coefﬁcients of the rest of the OECD (the “coefﬁcients
effect”), and their interaction.
3. Results
We begin by describing the long-term trends in life expectancy.
Fig. 1 shows the trends in life expectancy at birth, in three panels
grouped bywelfare regime: (A) social-democratic, (B) conservative,
and (C) liberal. Although we are not conducting a regime analysis,
and are instead interested in within-regime and over-time vari-
ability on speciﬁc social policy measures, we group the countries by
regime (a) for readability, and (b) as a bridge to previous work. In all
18 OECD nations, there is a positive, nearly linear trend. There are,
however, several notable deviations from the main trend. Panel A
shows Finland's rapid catch-up in the 1970s and early 1980s, and
Denmark's slower rate of improvement until the early 1990s (the
Danish deviation may be related to smoking [Preston et al., 2010]).
Panel C shows the divergence of the US fromAustralia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the UK started in the late 1990s.
3.1. Long-term trends in welfare generosity
Fig. 2 shows the long-term trends in overall welfare generosity.
The between-country differences are so great that the scale of the
y-axis differs signiﬁcantly across the panels: Denmark, Finland,
Norway, and Sweden range from about 29 to about 47. The conti-
nental European countries and Japan range from about 20 to about
43. At the bottom of the range of welfare generosity, Australia,
Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK and the US range from about
11 to about 37. Interestingly, the upper range of the variation is
extended by Ireland's signiﬁcant welfare-state expansion during
the 2000s, when its generosity score increased from about 25 to
over 32. We note that our ﬁxed-effects estimation relies on this
within-country variation.
3.2. Fixed-effects and autocorrelation-corrected estimates
To test the hypothesis that welfare generosity is associated with
life expectancy in these 18 rich democracies, we estimate re-
gressions of two measures of life expectancy (at birth, and at age
65) on a linear trend variable, and each of our four measures of
welfare generosity. In all the regressions, we also include country
ﬁxed effects (which control for any effects of unmeasured between-
country characteristics), as well as an adjustment for serial auto-
correlation. We note that autocorrelation is quite strong in these
data, with estimated rhos above 0.9. Correcting for serial autocor-
relation effectively removes most of the year-to-year variation from
our data, creating a very stringent hypothesis test.
The results show robust associations between welfare gener-
osity and life expectancy. Table 1, which displays the models of life
expectancy at birth, shows that the effect of welfare generosity
(b ¼ 0.167) is nearly half as large in magnitude as the linear trend
(b ¼ 0.313). Disaggregating overall generosity by measuring gen-
erosity separately for each major welfare domain reveals that not
all effects are equal: the estimated effect of pension generosity
(b¼ 0.439) is even larger in magnitude than the linear trend, and is
also larger than the effects of overall generosity (b ¼ 0.167), un-
employment beneﬁt generosity (b ¼ 0.225), and sickness beneﬁt
generosity (b ¼ 0.113). The large effect of pension beneﬁts is
striking; we interpret this as suggestive evidence that economic
Fig. 1. Long-term trends in life expectancy at birth. Fig. 2. Long-term trends in overall welfare generosity.
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ulation health as these populations age (several of these countries
have large “baby-boomer” cohorts), and as chronic conditions
become more important. Sensitivity analysis (displayed in
Tables 6e8) shows substantively identical results for life expec-
tancy at age 65, female life expectancy at birth, and male life ex-
pectancy at birth.Table 2 shows results for models that lag the covariates by ten
years, to guard against the possibility of endogeneity bias. Once
again the coefﬁcients for the measures of social policy generosity
are all positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 3 shows results from models of life expectancy at birth
that add controls for GDP per capita, the proportion of the popu-
lation aged 65 and older, and public and mandatory private social
Table 2
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Life Expectancy at Birth
on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Generosity,
Sickness Insurance Generosity, and Pension Beneﬁt Generosity; Covariates Lagged
Ten Years (n ¼ 455).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.386***
(7.94)
0.405***
(9.24)
0.373***
(8.21)
0.398***
(8.31)
0.408***
(9.17)
Generosity 0.435***
(10.05)
Unemployment 0.736***
(7.88)
Sickness 0.369***
(3.96)
Pension 0.975***
(9.27)
Constant 70.72***
(511.92)
55.84***
(281.27)
63.52***
(389.70)
66.44***
(376.02)
58.43***
(308.34)
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 3
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Life Expectancy at Birth
on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Generosity,
Sickness Insurance Generosity, Pension Beneﬁt, Log Real GDP Per Capita, Population
Aged 65 and Older as % of Total, and Public and Mandatory Private Social Expen-
diture (n ¼ 465).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.00126
(0.08)
0.00331
(0.22)
0.00237
(0.15)
0.000294
(0.02)
0.00715
(0.49)
GDP p.c. (log) 5.688***
(53.99)
5.591***
(50.21)
5.713***
(52.86)
5.650***
(52.59)
5.533***
(52.76)
Age 65þ % of Pop. 0.239***
(4.29)
0.241***
(4.38)
0.239***
(4.29)
0.237***
(4.30)
0.251***
(4.71)
Social Expenditure 0.125***
(9.04)
0.119***
(8.56)
0.127***
(9.09)
0.124***
(9.03)
0.112***
(8.16)
Generosity 0.0426*
(2.48)
Unemployment 0.0324
(0.99)
Sickness 0.0563
(1.60)
Pension 0.193***
(4.86)
Constant 2.975***
(25.03)
3.102***
(26.18)
2.993***
(25.17)
3.071***
(25.82)
3.365***
(28.79)
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 4
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Life Expectancy at Birth
on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Generosity,
Sickness Insurance Generosity, Pension Beneﬁt, Log Real GDP Per Capita, Population
Aged 65 and Older as % of Total, and Public and Mandatory Private Social Expen-
diture; Covariates Lagged Ten Years (n ¼ 283).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.0412*
(2.51)
0.0331*
(1.99)
0.0412*
(2.50)
0.0332*
(2.01)
0.0320
(1.89)
GDP p.c. (log) 6.091***
(63.61)
6.012***
(57.67)
6.090***
(60.77)
6.035***
(61.77)
6.013***
(57.59)
Age 65þ % of Pop. 0.198**
(2.61)
0.186*
(2.47)
0.198**
(2.61)
0.174*
(2.29)
0.192*
(2.55)
Social Expenditure 0.114***
(6.90)
0.111***
(6.71)
0.114***
(6.84)
0.116***
(7.06)
0.109***
(6.47)
Generosity 0.0330
(1.61)
Unemployment 0.000159
(0.004)
Sickness 0.0803*
(2.01)
Pension 0.0893
(1.65)
Constant 4.470***
(32.11)
4.469***
(31.77)
4.470***
(31.97)
4.487***
(32.14)
4.522***
(32.25)
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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and log real GDP per capita means that precise estimates of their
independent associations are not possible; in the model with GDP
per capita, which itself has a strong positive association with life
expectancy at birth, year loses its statistical signiﬁcance. Given that
the social expenditure measure reﬂects, in part, spending from
citizenship entitlements, it is surprising that the associations be-
tween total welfare generosity and life expectancy, and between
pension generosity and life expectancy, are both robust to the in-
clusion of these controls. That unemployment generosity and
sickness generosity lose statistical signiﬁcance and approach zero
suggests that their effects may be absorbed by the expenditure
measure. We note that we do not interpret the coefﬁcient for the
size of the population aged 65 and older as the estimate of a causal
effect; it could be interpreted as evidence of the rectangularization
of the survival curve (Nusselder and Mackenbach, 1996).
Table 4 shows the same progression of models, with the cova-
riates lagged by ten years. Note ﬁrst that the sample size drops
signiﬁcantly, to n ¼ 283, because ten years of observations are lost
for each of the 18 OECD countries in the analysis. In these models,the coefﬁcient on social spending retains its positive sign, magni-
tude and statistical signiﬁcance, but the CWED-based policy mea-
sures lose signiﬁcance. Given the available data, it is impossible to
evaluate whether the change in coefﬁcients is driven more by the
decreased sample size, the changed period of observation, or the
multicollinearity introduced by the correlations between the
CWED policy measures and the expenditure measure (the bivariate
correlations range from 0.51 to 0.80).3.3. How much of the US mortality disadvantage is explained by
social policy?
To evaluate the extent to which social policy shortcomings
explain the US mortality disadvantage, we extend the analysis in
two ways. First, we re-estimated the models with Sweden as the
omitted country instead of the US as the omitted country, in order
to observe how the difference between the US and a leader in
population health changes over time (this is of course equivalent to
subtracting the ﬁxed effect for Sweden from the constant term
where the US serves as the omitted category). The logic of this test
is that the addition of our social policy measures to a model that
includes a linear trend and ﬁxed effects, but no other covariates,
should reduce the size of the difference between the US and Swe-
den (chosen for its high levels of life expectancy). Second, we
conduct a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition analysis of the regression
results, in order to estimate what the US mortality disadvantage
would be if US social policies were as generous as the average rich
democracy.
Both analyses yield evidence of a strong role for social policy
shortcomings in explaining the US mortality disadvantage. First, in
a model of life expectancy at birth with Sweden as the reference
category, the US ﬁxed effect drops from 2.88 to 2.43 when total
generosity is added to themodel. When all four policymeasures are
added to the same model, the US ﬁxed effect drops even further,
to 1.70. Second, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition shows that US
life expectancy at birth would be 3.77 years longer than it is, if the
US had the average social policy proﬁle of the other 17 OECD
member states included in the analysis. We emphasize that the
counterfactual scenario involves attributing to the US the average
Table 5
Regression Decomposition of the US Life Expectancy Disadvantage.
US vs. 17 OECD Nations
US OECD
bYear (s.e.) 0.149
(0.005)
0.221
(0.004)
bGenerosity (s.e.) 0.311
(0.050)
0.006
(0.007)
Constant (s.e.) 65.7
(0.987)
71.9
(0.231)
Endowments effect (change in US LE if US had OECD-average generosity):
3.77 (s.e. ¼ 0.657)
Coefﬁcients effect (change in US LE if US had OECD coefﬁcients): 1.29
(s.e. ¼ 0.146)
Interaction between endowments effect and coefﬁcients effect: 3.38
(s.e. ¼ 0.590)
US vs. Nordic Nations (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden)
US Nordic
bYear (s.e.) 0.149
(0.005)
0.168
(0.006)
bGenerosity (s.e.) 0.311
(0.050)
0.154
(0.016)
Constant (s.e.) 65.7
(0.987)
67.4
(0.231)
Endowments effect (change in US LE if US had Nordic-average generosity):
5.56 (s.e. ¼ 0.950)
Coefﬁcients effect (change in US LE if US had Nordic coefﬁcients): 1.24
(s.e. ¼ 0.302)
Interaction between endowments effect and coefﬁcients effect: 2.74
(s.e. ¼ 0.928)
Table 6
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Life Expectancy at Age
65 on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Gener-
osity, Sickness Insurance Generosity, and Pension Beneﬁt Generosity (n ¼ 637).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.168***
(17.99)
0.173***
(19.28)
0.168***
(18.51)
0.169***
(18.66)
0.168***
(20.02)
Generosity 0.0659***
(6.44)
Unemployment 0.0496*
(2.41)
Sickness 0.0678***
(3.34)
Pension 0.199***
(8.43)
Constant 13.14***
(508.47)
10.78***
(283.03)
12.63***
(399.70)
12.38***
(388.02)
10.72***
(309.13)
Notes:
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 7
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Female Life Expectancy
at Birth on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance
Generosity, Sickness Insurance Generosity, and Pension Beneﬁt Generosity
(n ¼ 641).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.231***
(8.06)
0.252***
(9.14)
0.241***
(8.57)
0.235***
(8.26)
0.237***
(8.89)
Generosity 0.166***
(6.90)
Unemployment 0.211***
(4.54)
Sickness 0.109*
(2.32)
Pension 0.449***
(7.54)
Constant 74.87***
(1136.11)
68.50***
(810.59)
72.27***
(989.01)
73.56***
(984.65)
69.11***
(821.27)
Notes:
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
J. Beckﬁeld, C. Bambra / Social Science & Medicine 171 (2016) 30e3836non-US OECD values for the policy measures, not the maximum
non-US OECD values. Our decomposition suggests the US could
gain nearly four years in life expectancy just by catching up to the
OECD average, not by becoming a social-policy leader. To address
the more stringent counterfactual, we compared the US to the most
generous welfare states, Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden.
We ﬁnd that if the US had the social policy proﬁle of these leading
welfare states, life expectancy at birth would be 5.56 years longer
than it is. Table 5 shows the results.Table 8
Fixed-Effects and Autocorrelation-Corrected Regressions of Male Life Expectancy at
Birth on Linear Trend, Overall Welfare Generosity, Unemployment Insurance Gen-
erosity, Sickness Insurance Generosity, and Pension Beneﬁt Generosity (n ¼ 641).
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year (0 ¼ 1970) 0.320***
(12.85)
0.341***
(14.10)
0.326***
(13.42)
0.325***
(13.08)
0.328***
(13.78)
Generosity 0.163***
(7.11)
Unemployment 0.234***
(5.03)
Sickness 0.121**
(2.66)
Pension 0.397***
(7.27)
Constant 66.12***
(1073.51)
59.93***
(739.57)
63.55***
(884.83)
64.66***
(907.50)
60.93***
(788.53)
Notes:
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.4. Discussion
Year-to-year changes in life expectancy in the United States have
failed to keep up with those in other rich democracies. Existing
work that focuses on lifestyle and healthcare as candidate expla-
nations has explained only part of the US mortality disadvantage.
Newer research is turning to political institutions as possible so-
lutions to this puzzle (Bambra and Beckﬁeld, 2012), as newer
theoretical developments in social and spatial epidemiology also
argue for more attention to “upstream” and societal causes of
population health (Hall and Lamont, 2009; Link and Phelan, 1995).
A major area of scholarly debate within this newer literature sur-
rounds the welfare state: does the US have a mortality disadvan-
tage in part because it has a welfare-state disadvantage?
Our research suggests that the answer may be: “Yes.” While
most existing research relies on cross-sectional comparative de-
signs that overlook within-country variation in welfare states, and
aggregate together all domains of the welfare state, our study uses
newly-available measures of welfare generosity in the domains of
unemployment, sickness, and pension beneﬁts (as well as a sum-
mary measure), and ﬁxed-effects regression techniques that use
(only) within-country variation for estimation. Our results are un-
ambiguous: within-country, over-time increases in welfare gener-
osity are strongly, positively, and statistically-signiﬁcantly
associated with within-country, over-time changes in lifeexpectancy.
There are various potential pathways whereby less generous US
social policy may contribute to an additional burden of ill health.
These include poverty, incarceration, and public health (de)regu-
lation. The US has relatively high rates of poverty with over 17% of
J. Beckﬁeld, C. Bambra / Social Science & Medicine 171 (2016) 30e38 37US citizens experiencing ‘relative poverty’ (deﬁned as having less
than 50% of the average [median] national income) compared to
11% in the UK and around 7% in Denmark (Woolf and Aron, 2013).
The US also has the highest rates of child poverty amongst high-
income countries; in excess of 20% of US children live in poverty
e disproportionately concentrated amongst African American
children. The links between poverty and poor health are well
established. For example, Nelson and Fritzell (2014) examined the
role of antipoverty strategies in explaining international differences
in population level mortality rates and life expectancy: countries
that provided higher minimum income beneﬁts, and therefore had
lower poverty rates, had better population health. The US also has
far higher rates of incarceration (Schrecker and Bambra, 2015),
which contributes to ill health among the incarcerated and their
families (Wildeman et al., 2012).
Market regulation to promote public health is also another po-
tential pathway. Preventative health policy such as regulating
saturated fat levels in food can reduce cardiovascular disease,
reducing air pollution levels lowers risks for respiratory and car-
diovascular disease, and workplace health and safety regulations
reduce workplace accidents and illnesses (Mackenbach and McKee,
2013). The US has the highest rates of obesity, and it also regulates
products and their advertising less than other comparable coun-
tries (De Vogli et al., 2014).
Methodologically, our paper has presented a new way of ana-
lysing the associations between welfare states and health. We have
used a newly available source of data e the Comparative Welfare
Entitlements Database II (Scruggs et al., 2014) e to address meth-
odological shortcomings of previous work. We disaggregated the
measurement of the welfare state into three primary policy do-
mains (unemployment insurance, sickness beneﬁts, and pensions).
We also use models that are robust to unmeasured between-
country differences and serial autocorrelation of repeated mea-
sures (ﬁxed-effects estimation with autocorrelation-corrected
standard errors). Our methods therefore overcome some of the
criticisms of previous “welfare state regime” based research: Firstly,
they present a longitudinal analysis where most previous research
has been cross-sectional. Secondly, by looking at speciﬁc indicators
of welfare generosity across speciﬁc individual policy domains,
they allow a more detailed examination and isolation of social
policy effects on population health (Lundberg et al., 2008). Previous
welfare states and health research has been criticised as the re-
gimes concept assumes that most of the key social policy areas
within a welfare regime (i.e. social transfers, education, health care,
public health regulation) will reﬂect a similar across the board
approach to welfare provision and that each regime type itself re-
ﬂects “a set of principles or values that establishes a coherence in each
country's welfare package” (Kasza, 2002). We therefore build on
recent research by Van der Wel et al. (2011), who take an institu-
tional approach to analysing welfare state effects (their analysis
examined the effects of social expenditure on inequalities in the
employment of people with ill health) and thereby helps to unpack
‘the black box’ of welfare state regimes (Castles, 2008). The draw-
back of this approach though is that “it prevents an examination of
the impact of the entire complexity and dynamics of welfare programs
and their interaction with other institutions, like a regime approach
does” (Van der Wel et al., 2011).
Future research should address the limitations of our study.
First, individual-level mortality data should be integrated with
individual-level policy coverage data to assess the mechanisms
whereby the welfare state improves population health. Such data
are exceedingly scarce, and should be the topmost priority for the
international research infrastructure. Second, the timing of these
effects should be disentangled, and the possibilities of cumulative
effects should be explored, since our analysis is limited toassociations between short-term within-country changes. Third,
although our ﬁxed-effects models simulate control for all unmea-
sured, between-country differences, we were limited in our ability
to add time-varying covariates; for instance, the potential role of
medical technology should be explored in future work. Fourth, we
acknowledge that the associations between social policy generosity
and life expectancy at age 65 may be affected by residual con-
founding. Fifth, our ability to assess the role of voluntary private
welfare spending is limited by our data. Sixth and ﬁnally, we
cannot, with the data we have access to, completely rule out
endogeneity bias.
5. Conclusion
The United States has a mortality disadvantage relative to its
political and economic peer group. Previous research has focused
on lifestyle and health care explanations. In this paper, we present
the ﬁrst long-term longitudinal examination of the contribution of
the generosity of social policy programmes in explaining this
disadvantage. Using life expectancy and indicators of unemploy-
ment insurance, pensions and sickness insurance, we found a
substantively and statistically signiﬁcant association between
welfare generosity and population health e especially in regards to
pension provision. Our research suggests that there is evidence that
the US mortality disadvantage is, in part, a welfare state
disadvantage.
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